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THE CRAB FISHERMAN AND HIS
CHILDREN: A CONSTITUTIONAL
COMPASS FOR THE NONOFFENDING PARENT IN CHILD
PROTECTION CASES
ANGELA GREENE*
Parents have a constitutional right to raise their children without
interference from the state. It is also well settled that the state may
step into a family and take custody of a child if it finds that a
child’s welfare is in danger. Although an offending parent found
to be unfit by a court ruling could have his or her child taken
away, states differ as to what safeguards should be afforded to
non-offending parents in child custody cases. This Article argues
that Alaska, which has unsettled law in this area, should adopt
rules that protect the rights of non-offending parents with minimal
interference from the state. In order to help determine what rules
are appropriate, this Article describes different approaches states
have taken with regard to custody and non-offending parents and
it advocates for laws that protect the interests of non-offending
parents.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CRAB FISHERMAN AT SEA
There is no issue more important to the courts than the
mandate to protect children from abusive or neglectful parents.
Yet, the need to balance that compelling interest against the
fundamental rights of parents is a constitutionally confused area of
the law. It gets even more complicated when a fit, non-offending
parent presents himself to authorities and claims he is ready to care
for the child, even though the other parent may have neglected or
abused the child. At this point, the judge, lawyers, and children’s
services workers are left in a constitutional quandary: does the
court have any authority to intervene when a fit parent is present?
If so, when does that authority begin and end?
1
For example, suppose you spend much of the winter working
on the crew of a crab-fishing boat. You sail on the Bering Sea out
of Dutch Harbor, Alaska as part of the reality show The Deadliest

1. The following facts are a composite of actual cases and issues arising in
daily practice regarding child protection law in Western Alaska.

02__GREENE.DOC

2007]

12/17/2007 11:29:36 AM

NON-OFFENDING PARENTS’ RIGHTS

175

Catch.2 Although you are gone for months at a time, your wages
from this work support your family living in Anchorage for the
whole year. Before you left your home in Anchorage, your wife
and two children were fine, although your marriage was a bit rocky
due to your extended absences. However, to your knowledge, your
wife is a good mother to your children while you are gone.
Three months into your work on the Bering Sea, you receive
word from a social worker via satellite phone that your wife has
been arrested for driving while intoxicated with the children in the
car, and she was coming from her abusive boyfriend’s house. She
had a black eye and was too intoxicated to give the names of
relatives or friends who were able to take the children, so the social
worker placed the children in an emergency shelter in Anchorage.
The social worker also notifies you that your children are now
in state custody, because the Office of Children’s Services (OCS)
3
filed a petition in state court to have them declared in need of aid.
The temporary custody hearing authorizing the placement
occurred without your participation, because weather and
communication problems inherent in the region made it impossible
4
to contact you in time for the hearing.
You protest, claiming that you are perfectly capable of caring
for the children because your mother can take them until you get
off the boat. The social worker does move the children to their
grandmother’s house after this conversation, but OCS retains state
5
custody and continues to pursue a formal adjudication against you
and your family, in part because you cannot physically care for the
children yourself as you are still on the crab-fishing boat.
Incensed, you interrupt your season and pay your way from
the Bering Sea to Anchorage to retrieve your children from the
state, assuming that once you explain the situation to the social
worker yourself, this will be over and the state will leave your
family alone. You soon discover it is not that simple.
2. The Deadliest Catch is broadcast on the Discovery Channel and
documents the daily lives of crab fishermen on the Bering Sea.
3. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 6–7; see also
ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.011(8)–(10) (2006).
4. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 10.
5. Custody in Alaska means:
[T]he responsibility of physical care and control of the child, the
determination of where and with whom the child shall live, the right and
duty to protect, nurture, train, and discipline the child, the duty of
providing the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, and
the right and responsibility to make decisions of financial significance
concerning the child.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.084(a) (2006).
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After a week of travel, you arrive at the Anchorage OCS,
identification in hand, and request your children back. The social
workers refuse to give them to you, citing the temporary custody
order issued by the court, and instead allow you only supervised
visits at the OCS office. The social worker says she first has to do a
background check before she can let you see your kids without
supervision, although she cannot tell you how long that will take.
Two days later you have a court date, where you are formally
6
advised of the petition and appointed a lawyer. You explain to the
judge that you can care for your children and want them back
home with you, naively assuming that he will understand your
position, release the children to you, and allow you to get on with
your life. Instead, the court continues custody, leaving visitation at
the discretion of OCS, and sets the adjudication date for four
7
months in the future. Meanwhile, during those four months, you
will be expected to participate in a case plan with OCS designed to
8
reunite your family. You are stunned and begin to wonder how
the court can do this since you are the father, can care for the
children, and did not do anything to neglect or otherwise endanger
them.
In the language of child protection, the issues in this scenario
revolve around the constitutional rights of the non-offending
parent. The legal question is whether a court can adjudicate these
children as in need of aid when a fit, non-offending parent is willing
and able to care for them, notwithstanding the acts of the offending
9
parent. If adjudication is not permissible, then what steps can the
state take to administer its compelling interest in the safety of the
children put at risk by one parent, while still balancing the other
parent’s constitutional rights?
To make sense of this scenario and to answer these questions,
this Article will first give an overview of the relevant United States
Supreme Court case law governing the right to parent in order to
argue the unconstitutionality of adjudicating a child as in need of
aid when a fit and willing parent is present. The Article will then
6. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 10.
7. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (2006) (requiring that an adjudication
hearing be completed within 120 days).
8. See ALASKA CT. R., CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES, R. 13.
9. Alaska uses the term “child in need of aid” to describe a child brought
under the court’s supervision due to neglect or abuse. Other states use variations
on this terminology to describe neglected or abused children coming before the
court. In this Article, “child-in-need-of-aid,” “dependent,” and “neglected” are
terms used interchangeably to mean children who find themselves before the
court through their parents’ actions.
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survey the different state approaches to this problem, with special
comparison to Alaska law. Finally, it will present a model solution
for our crab fisherman that protects the child and the constitutional
rights of the fit parent. This Article seeks to provide a logical
conceptual framework for practitioners, judges, and state
legislators when addressing the issue of non-offending parents in
child protection proceedings.
II. A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CASE LAW: RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN CHILD PROTECTION CASES
It is settled law that parents have a fundamental right to
parent their children without interference by the state. This
fundamental right is protected by the liberty interest inherent in
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment and by the Ninth Amendment’s grant of residual
10
liberties to the people. As a matter of constitutional law, the
government may not restrict fundamental rights unless it
11
demonstrates a compelling interest. In the relationship between
parent and child, the state’s compelling interest exists if the parent
12
is unfit to make decisions regarding his or her own children.
Without a showing that a parent is unfit, the state normally has no
13
justification to interfere with the family unit.
Unfitness cannot be presumed by the parent’s circumstances;
the state must make an individualized assessment of the parent’s
14
ability to care for his children. Thus, the fact that one parent is
unfit does not alter the state’s burden to prove the other parent is
also unable to care for the child before it may interfere in the

10. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (holding that parents
have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of their
children and that courts should give deference to parents’ decisions); id. at 91–92
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children is a fundamental right protected by the Ninth Amendment);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(noting that the traditional relation of the family is a fundamental right protected
by the Ninth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding that marriage and procreation are fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause).
11. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993).
12. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
13. Id.
14. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–58 (1972).
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family.15 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that
when both parents are available for their children, the state must
prove that each parent is unfit before it may take custody of the
16
children or otherwise interfere with the family. According to the
Stanley Court, the individualized assessment of each parent is
necessary to prevent the arbitrary and unjustified interference with
17
a parent’s important fundamental right. To rule otherwise would
lead to a situation where one parent’s actions negate the
constitutional rights of the other.
States protect this fundamental right by specifically defining
parental unfitness in state child neglect and dependency laws.
These unfitness definitions are not standardized. However, each
18
has in common the goal of using the state’s parens patriae power
to protect the child while maintaining, when possible, the family
19
unit. No matter the particulars of the various state laws, once the
parents have been found to have committed an act or failed to take
an action, as defined under state law, that risks or leads to harm to
their children, the parents are also found constitutionally unfit to
exercise the fundamental right to care for and have custody of their
20
At this point, the state’s compelling interest in the
children.
welfare of children overrides the parents’ rights, and the state is
authorized to exercise its parens patriae power by taking action to
21
protect the child.

15. See id. at 652 (“What is the state interest in separating children from
fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a
particular case?”).
16. Recognizing that each parent has this fundamental right does not impede
the state’s ability to act when one parent is unknown and the known parent’s
actions put the child at risk. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
(emphasis added)). In the case of a missing or unknown parent, due process
would require a state to make every reasonable effort to contact that parent.
Diligent efforts to contact or identify the missing parent would be sufficient to
meet the demands of due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49
(1976).
17. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656–57.
18. “‘Parens patriae,’ literally ‘parent of the country,’ refers traditionally to
[the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal
disability.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
19. See infra Part III.
20. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
21. See id.
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Without a finding of unfitness, the state has no constitutional
authority to exercise that power.22 Furthermore, each parent is
23
In other words, under current
entitled to the same rights.
Supreme Court authority, the existence of a single fit parent,
regardless of the acts of the other parent, negates the state’s ability
24
to interfere in the family unit.
Adjudication of a child as dependent or neglected, even when
a fit parent is present and able to care for the child,
unconstitutionally trumps the fit parent’s fundamental right to
parent his or her child without state interference. With a fit parent
present, the state lacks any compelling interest sufficient to justify
state involvement in the family. Thus, adjudication of a child as
dependent or neglected, without a finding of unfitness on the part
of both parents, is unconstitutional because it permits the court to
interfere with the family unit without the requisite compelling
interest.
III. DEFINING THE NON-OFFENDING PARENT:
OVERVIEW OF ALASKA LAW AS COMPARED TO OTHER STATES
Alaska has not directly addressed the question of the effect of
the availability of a non-offending parent on adjudication, although
25
it has acknowledged the lack of clarity of the law in this area. The
26
use of misguided dicta in a previous Alaska case, Jeff A.C. v. State,
has muddied the waters in this area because the Jeff A.C. court
stated that adjudication can be had “based on the acts of just one
27
parent.” This statement created unnecessary confusion regarding
the substantive due process rights of non-offending parents,
because the father in Jeff A.C. raised a procedural, as opposed to
28
substantive, due process claim. The father argued only that he
had a procedural due process right to an adjudication hearing prior
to termination of parental rights, not that he was a fit parent to his
29
child. The Jeff A.C. case did not involve a fit parent who was
willing and able to care for his child and who had timely asserted
his fundamental right to parent without interference by the state.
In other words, he was not a true non-offending parent. One
22. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000).
23. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651–52.
24. Id. at 652.
25. See Peter A. v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs.,
146 P.3d 991, 996–97 n.30 (Alaska 2006).
26. 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).
27. Id. at 703.
28. Id. at 702.
29. Id. at 702–03.
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reason the father in Jeff A.C. was not a non-offending parent was
because he had unsuccessfully participated in a case plan with the
OCS and faced termination of his parental rights due to his failure
30
to assume responsibility for his child.
In contrast to the procedural claim in the Jeff A.C. case, the
Alaska Supreme Court’s treatment of the substantive issue in Peter
A. illustrates the difference in judicial consideration of the two
types of due process claims. The Peter A. case presented the court
with a fit, non-offending parent pressing a timely, substantive
31
constitutional claim. Instead of relying on the Jeff A.C. case, the
Alaska Supreme Court avoided the substantive constitutional
question altogether by finding the matter moot after the child was
32
released to the father at disposition. Nonetheless, the Alaska
33
Supreme Court did vacate the adjudication on equitable grounds.
The Court also acknowledged the gap in Alaska law regarding the
constitutional necessity of an adjudication hearing for both parents
34
if both of the parents are known.
Alaska’s avoidance of the question of substantive
constitutional rights contrasts with decisions from other states
directly addressing such rights of the fit, non-offending parent.
Nationwide, in deciding cases where there was a true nonoffending parent, four states have found that the presence of a fit
35
parent negates the state’s ability to interfere with the family.
Other states limit the court’s ability to interfere at the adjudication
stage with legislation designed to set boundaries on state power,
thereby avoiding the need to address the rights of non-offending
36
parents solely through case law.
30. Id. at 704–05.
31. Peter A. v. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children’s Servs.,
146 P.3d 991, 993 (Alaska 2006).
32. Id. at 994.
33. Id. at 997.
34. Id. at 996–97 n.30.
35. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); In re
Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985); In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849,
850 (Pa. 2000); Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (W. Va. 1975).
36. Peter A., 146 P.3d at n.30; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4035(2)(C)
(2005) (requiring court to make “a jeopardy determination with regard to each
parent who has been properly served”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3819(e) (2006) (“If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one
parent of the child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to
care for the child, the court may not find that the child is in need of assistance, but,
before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.”); In
re Okla. Unif. Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 131 (Okla. 2005)
(discussing necessary evidence for adjudication of deprivation of a child and
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A few states take a different approach, drawing the
constitutional line at custody. These states permit an adjudication
of the child as in need of assistance even when a presumptively fit
parent is present. However, a fit parent is entitled to physical and
legal custody of his or her child absent a showing of unfitness, the
37
acts of the other parent notwithstanding.
Finally, Ohio stands alone among the states in drawing no
constitutional line at all. Ohio permits the adjudication and
disposition of a child into state custody even when a fit, non38
offending parent is present.
Each of these approaches will be addressed in detail in Part IV
and Part V of this Article, with Part V offering a model solution for
Alaska based on a constitutional analysis of these approaches to a
non-offending parent’s rights.
IV. ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS STATE APPROACHES TO THE
NON-OFFENDING PARENT AND A COMPARISON TO ALASKA LAW
As stated above, the lack of clarity in Alaska law on the issue
of the non-offending parent is the result of dicta in a procedural
due process case that did not involve a true non-offending parent.
A non-offending parent, like our crab fisherman, would press both
a substantive and a procedural due process claim at the trial court
level in order to try to get his children released to him
39
immediately. As a fit parent, he would not wait around for a
40
termination proceeding, like the father in Jeff A.C. v. State did,
before asserting only a procedural due process right to a hearing he

stating that a child is not deprived “if the other parent was providing satisfactory
care for the child”).
37. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2 (West 2006); In re Austin P., 13 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 616, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); B.C. v. Dept. of Children and Families, 864
So.2d 486, 490–91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the Florida statute
allows adjudication based on acts of one parent, but remanding to allow father to
make a record on an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute); In re
Stephanie H., 639 N.W.2d 668, 680–81 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
38. In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Ohio 2006).
39. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120–22 (1989). The
Michael H. court rejected a father’s separate procedural and substantive due
process claims to his biological child born during the marriage of the mother to
another man. The father’s procedural claim rested on California’s failure to
provide him a forum to assert his substantive claim. The substantive claim
asserted that the mother’s marriage was an insufficiently compelling interest to
interfere with his constitutionally protected rights as a father—a separate claim
from the lack of a procedural mechanism to enforce the asserted substantive right.
40. 117 P.3d 697, 699 (Alaska 2005).
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should have asked for upon first contact with the state. However,
Alaska is not alone in contributing to the confusion about the
substantive fundamental rights of parents—Michigan made the
same error in another procedural due process case.
To illustrate the distinction between the procedural and
substantive claims and to point out the deficiency in Alaska law,
this Part will begin with an analysis of analytically parallel Alaska
and Michigan decisions that used regrettably broad language to
address procedural claims raised by parents who were clearly not
fit. Then, the discussion will focus on Alaska’s reaction to an
appeal raised by a true non-offending parent who was fit, yet saw
his children adjudicated as in need of aid. In this comparison, the
contrast between the procedural and substantive claims becomes
clear, and the gap between Alaska law and other states’ more
comprehensive laws stands in stark relief.
Next, this Part of the Article will concentrate on the
approaches taken by those other states in confronting substantive
constitutional claims raised in non-offending parent cases. While
the details of the laws vary greatly across the states, and the case
law interpreting these provisions is often driven by unpleasant
facts, there are two dominant approaches explicitly addressing the
substantive rights of non-offending parents in child protection
cases. For non-offending parents, states either do not permit
adjudication if a fit parent is present and able to care for the child
or do permit adjudication but draw the constitutional line at the
custody determination.
A. The Theory that Trial Court Jurisdiction Attaches to the Child:
Misguided Dicta from Alaska and Michigan that Does Not
Apply to True Non-Offending Parent Cases.
Alaska and Michigan courts have both decided strikingly
similar cases that are seen as permitting adjudication based on the
actions of only one parent. However, given the facts and
procedural posture of those cases, it is overreaching to conclude
that they stand for the proposition that an adjudication of a child as
dependant or neglected can constitutionally occur when a fit parent
is available. These cases did not involve a non-offending parent
asserting fundamental rights; instead, they were procedural cases
with parents unable to remedy the conditions that led to the
children being placed in state custody. Thus, the parents faced
termination of their parental rights.
The Alaska Supreme Court considered a procedural due
process argument that a father’s rights to his children could not be
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terminated without a prior adjudication specifically as to him.41 In
Jeff A.C., the state placed the children in state custody due to the
42
mother’s substance abuse. The mother then incorrectly identified
43
the father to the social worker. Thus, the state initially pursued
44
reunification efforts with the wrong person. After approximately
one year, the OCS identified Jeff as the father and located him in
45
Following an initial period of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
resistance, Jeff participated in a case plan for a year and during that
time never asserted his right to force the state to prove him unfit in
46
Jeff’s efforts ultimately proved
an adjudication hearing.
unsuccessful, and the state filed a petition to terminate his parental
47
rights. After the state filed the termination petition, and just prior
to trial, the father moved to bifurcate the proceedings and asserted
48
his right to a separate adjudication hearing before termination.
The trial court denied that motion, and, after a contested
49
proceeding, terminated the father’s parental rights.
On appeal, the father claimed the lack of a prior adjudication
was error and asserted that procedural due process entitled him to
50
an adjudication before his parental rights could be terminated.
The Alaska Supreme Court held that a prior adjudication was not
required, particularly when the father’s conduct was sufficient to
51
justify termination of his parental rights. However, rather than
focusing solely on the procedural aspects of the case in rejecting
the claim, in dicta the court mistakenly linked the jurisdiction of
the trial court to that of the child’s status. The court stated that the
“ultimate focus of a [child-in-need-of-aid] adjudication is on the
52
child, not the parents.” The court then stated that a child can be
adjudicated based on the acts of one parent and that the “other
parent’s acquiescence or fault in allowing the abuse to occur is not
53
required in order to find the child to be in need of aid.” With this
broad language, the Alaska court incorrectly conflated the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 700–04.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700–02.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 702–03.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Alaska 1989)).
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substantive and procedural due process aspects of child protection
cases. As demonstrated in Part II of this Article, the matter of the
constitutional necessity of a hearing and adjudication on both
parents, if known, was settled by the United States Supreme Court
54
in Stanley v. Illinois.
Aside from the constitutional concerns in the wording of the
Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Jeff A.C., the “child-centered”
language is an inaccurate summary of the purpose and scope of the
55
Alaska statutes. Alaska specifically defines the acts or omissions
by the parents upon the child which render the parent legally unfit
56
to raise the child. Indeed, any other interpretation of Alaska
statute
section
47.10.011
would
render
the
statute
57
unconstitutional.
In a similar case where a parent asserted a procedural due
process claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals made the same error
as the Alaska Supreme Court. In Michigan, the court of appeals
held that a termination order could be entered against both
parents, even when the trial court had not held a prior adjudication
58
as to the father. While procedurally this may be correct for a
number of reasons, the Michigan court also included unfortunate
dicta that based the jurisdiction of the court over a family solely on
the child’s condition, not the acts of the parents.
In In re C.R., the state child protective agency filed a petition
alleging that the substance abuse and extensive criminal histories of
both parents caused the children to come within the jurisdiction of
59
Subsequently, the parties reached an
the Michigan courts.
agreement whereby the mother would plead no contest to the
allegations in the petition, the petition against the father would be

54. 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972).
55. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (2006).
56. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(1) (parent abandons child); § 47.10.011(2)
(parent incarcerated and other parent absent); § 47.10.011(3) (parent’s
whereabouts unknown and custodian unable to provide care); § 47.10.011(4)
(parent knowingly fails to provide medical treatment); § 47.10.011(6) (parent fails
to adequately supervise child); § 47.10.011(7) (sexual abuse from parent or by
failure of parent to adequately supervise child); § 47.10.011(8) (parent creates
conditions terrifying child or exposes child to violence); § 47.10.011(9) (parent
neglects child); § 47.10.011(10) (parent’s ability to parent impaired by alcohol); §
47.10.011(11) (parent mentally ill); § 47.10.011(12) (parent approves of or
encourages illegal behavior by child). An exception is Alaska Statute section
47.10.011(5), which allows a runaway child to be deemed a CINA.
57. See supra Part II.
58. In re C.R., 646 N.W.2d 506, 515–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
59. Id. at 508.
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dismissed, and both parties would participate in family support
services recommended by the state.60
Despite agreeing to participate in the services offered, the
parents continued to drink, neglected their children, and the father
went as far as to shave all the hair off his body to avoid complying
61
After approximately
with the court’s order for drug testing.
eighteen months of unsuccessful reunification efforts, the state filed
62
a termination petition against both parents. The trial court found
that both parents suffered from alcohol and drug addictions that
impaired their ability to parent their children and that termination
63
was in the children’s best interests. The father and mother both
64
appealed the order.
On appeal, the father argued that because the original petition
against him had been dismissed, and no subsequent adjudication
entered, the appellate court must reverse the trial court’s
termination order because his right to procedural due process of
65
law was violated. The Michigan court disagreed, finding that,
under Michigan law, once the trial court found jurisdiction over the
children due to the mother’s no-contest agreement, the court had
the right to compel the other parent to adhere to a case plan or
66
In
take other steps necessary to reunify with their children.
deciding this issue, the Michigan court held that the state rules did
not require the child protection agency to allege and prove child
67
dependency against every parent involved. Instead, the Michigan
court found jurisdiction tied to the status of the children, thus
permitting the court to terminate parental rights of a parent who
68
has not been an official party to the prior proceedings.
This decision has been cited for the proposition that a court
can interfere with the family unit even when a fit parent is available
69
to care for the child. This case stands for nothing of the sort.

60. Id. at 508–09.
61. Id. at 509–10.
62. Id. at 510.
63. Id. at 511.
64. Id. The mother’s appellate arguments involved the sufficiency of the
evidence against her and are not relevant to the issues addressed in this Article.
65. Id. at 511.
66. Id. at 514–16.
67. Id. at 515.
68. Id.
69. See Vivek Sankaran, But I Didn’t Do Anything Wrong: Revisiting the
Rights of Non-Offending Parents in Child Protection Proceedings, 82 MICH. BAR.
J. 22 (2006) (criticizing as unconstitutional Michigan’s statutory scheme that he
interprets as allowing adjudication based on acts of one parent).
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Because this father was not a non-offending parent, the decision
does not stand for the proposition that single parent adjudication is
70
constitutionally permissible if one parent is fit.
The father in C.R. was clearly not fit and had submitted to the
71
court’s jurisdiction for at least a year prior to the termination trial.
During the entirety of the proceedings involving his family, he did
not claim a right to adjudication or the right to make the state
72
prove him unfit before it interfered with his family. Further, the
appellate court’s holding was grounded in procedural, not
73
substantive, due process. Nowhere in the C.R. decision does the
court decide whether a fit parent may be deprived of the right to
the unfettered care and custody of his children without a finding of
unfitness, nor did it have reason to do so, as the father was
obviously unfit.
In addition, the Michigan court’s statement that jurisdiction of
the court is dependent on the status of the child is, like Alaska’s,
incorrect as a matter of state law. Michigan Statute section
712A.2(b) defines what it means to be an unfit parent in Michigan.
This law speaks only to acts or omissions of the parents or guardian
74
that leave a child a ward of the court. Like its Alaska counterpart,

70. Contra id. In his article, Professor Sankaren reads C.R. too broadly and
applies it to a non-offending parent situation but does not argue that the decision
is easily distinguishable on the grounds that C.R. was a procedural due process
case, not one involving a true non-offending parent asserting his or her
substantive, fundamental rights before the court. See id.
71. See In re C.R., 646 N.W.2d at 508–11.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 518–19.
74. Michigan Statute section 712A.2(b) states in large part:
Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age found
within the county:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or
other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a
substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is
abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is
without proper custody or guardianship. . . .
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian,
nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to
live in.
(3) Whose parent has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply
with a limited guardianship placement plan described in section 5205 of
the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.5205,
regarding the juvenile.
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it is parental conduct that determines whether a Michigan child is
dependent or neglected, not merely the condition of the child.
Thus, the Michigan appellate court’s conclusion that jurisdiction in
child protection cases is based on the children is incorrect; it is the
parents’ acts that determine whether they are unfit caretakers for
their children. These distinctions render the Michigan court’s
language regarding jurisdiction being vested in the children nothing
more than misguided dicta.
Both Alaska and Michigan use their child protection statutes
to provide the individualized assessment of parental unfitness
necessary before the state may interfere with the parent’s
75
fundamental right to raise their children. The parents’ actions
must be found lacking to instigate state parens patriae jurisdiction
76
Thus, neither the Alaska nor the Michigan
over the child.
decision can be used to justify a conclusion that a court could
constitutionally adjudicate a child as in need of aid when a nonoffending, fit parent is available to care for the child, even if the
other parent was found unfit.
Indeed, when presented with just that issue, the Alaska
Supreme Court did not apply its child-centered language from Jeff
A.C., but instead punted. In Peter A. v. Department of Health &
77
Social Services, the father appealed an adjudication order entered
solely on the basis of his wife’s substance abuse problems and the

(4) Whose parent has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply
with a court-structured plan described in section 5207 or 5209 of the
estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.5207 and
700.5209, regarding the juvenile. (5) If the juvenile has a guardian under
the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.1101
to 700.8102, and the juvenile’s parent meets both of the following
criteria:
(A) The parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting
the juvenile, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide
regular and substantial support for the juvenile for 2 years or more
before the filing of the petition or, if a support order has been
entered, has failed to substantially comply with the order for 2 years
or more before the filing of the petition.
(B) The parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate
with the juvenile, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected,
without good cause, to do so for 2 years or more before the filing of
the petition.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(b) (2007) (finding jurisdiction where, for example,
parents fail to provide necessary medical and educational care, create an unfit
environment, or violate other relevant statutes).
75. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972).
76. Id. at 658.
77. 146 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2006).
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risk it posed to their children.78 He had been hospitalized for more
than a year for serious and permanent injuries sustained in a
snowmachine accident when the OCS placed his children in state
79
custody. OCS did so because the mother arrived intoxicated at
the hospital facility to visit with the father late one night, bringing
80
two of her children with her.
The state filed an emergency petition based solely on the
81
mother’s conduct. The father appealed the adjudication, claiming
he was a fit parent and thus entitled to raise his children without
82
further state interference. However, the trial court found the
83
children in need of aid under Alaska law. The trial court did not
make a finding against the father; instead, the adjudication of childin-need-of-aid status was based entirely on the actions of the
84
mother.
At the disposition hearing, one month after adjudication, the
state moved to dismiss the case and release the children from
supervision because they had been safe at home with the father for
85
four months. The father agreed to the dismissal, but appealed the
adjudication which found that his children were in need of aid on
86
the grounds that the state did not find him unfit to care for them.
Because the children had a fit parent with full custodial rights,
ready, willing and able to care for them, the father argued that the
state lacked any compelling interest sufficient to justify the court’s
87
jurisdiction over his children prior to the dismissal of the case.
Peter A. was a true non-offending parent who timely asserted
his right to parent his children. Faced with this situation, the
Alaska Supreme Court did not apply the Jeff A.C. case to its
analysis, or its child-centered language.
Instead, the court
acknowledged the lack of precision in Alaska law and noted that
Alaska’s statute did not specifically address the rights of both
88
parents. As to the father’s constitutional arguments, the court

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 992.
Id. at 992–93.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996, n.30.
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found the matter moot as the children had been returned to him,
but, as a matter of equity, vacated the adjudication order.89
As the Peter A. case demonstrates, the unfortunate dicta in the
prior Alaska and Michigan opinions, implying that it is solely the
condition of the child that confers jurisdiction on courts in child
protective proceedings, only confuses what should be a rather
straightforward issue. Can the state prove the child has no fit
parent available to care for him or her? If no fit parent exists, then
the state has the compelling interest to act as parens patriae. If a fit
parent is available to care for the child, then the state lacks the
compelling interest to interfere and must return the child to that
parent. Putting the emphasis on the child’s status permits the state
to skip the constitutionally required unfitness finding for each
parent and unnecessarily complicates what should be a relatively
simple matter.
B. The Simple and Constitutional System: A State Does Not
Have the Power to Interfere with the Family When a Fit
Parent is Available to Care for the Child
Unlike Alaska and Michigan, three other states—New York,
Maryland and Pennsylvania—have each directly addressed the
issue of the fit, non-offending parent through case law and found
that a child cannot be deemed dependent or neglected if a fit
90
parent is available to care for that child. Alaska should adopt the
reasoning of these states, either through legislation or case law,
because requiring proof of unfitness against both parents at
adjudication has the virtue of being both simple and constitutional,
and it can be done in a manner that protects children.
New York has consistently held that a child cannot be
91
adjudged dependent if a fit parent is available to care for her. In

89. Id. at 994–96.
90. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); In re M.L.,
757 A.2d 849 (Pa. 2000); see also In re Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1985); In re Okla. Unif. Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 131
(Okla. 2005) (discussing necessary evidence for adjudication of deprivation of a
child and stating that a child is not deprived “if the other parent was providing
satisfactory care for the child.”); Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118, 122 (W. Va.
1975) (finding that non-offending parent may not be deprived of custody of his
children).
91. See Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 477; see also Alfredo S. v. Nassau County
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 568 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“If the
department believed the petitioner to be an unfit father, it was obligated to make
a sufficient showing in this proceeding of extraordinary circumstances, or to
commence a neglect proceeding against him.”).
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In re Cheryl K., the mother was not a party to the original child
abuse hearing that found that the minor’s father had sexually
92
abused her. The trial judge placed the child in state custody. A
year later the mother moved to vacate the placement of the child in
93
foster care. The New York court framed the substantive issue as
follows: “Where the court has adjudicated only one parent of
abuse or neglect, does the non-offending parent, not a party to the
proceedings, have, absent a finding of neglect or unfitness, a right
to custody of her children superior to that of third parties,
94
including the Commissioner of Social Services?”
The New York court determined that the mother did have that
superior right against all third parties and that the right was based
95
on her fundamental right to the care and custody of her child.
Without a finding of unfitness against the parent, the court has no
authority to intervene in family affairs. The court also noted that
the Commissioner had a remedy if he were concerned about the
welfare of the child in the mother’s custody, since he was free to
file a petition alleging that the mother was unfit to care for her
96
child. The court stayed its own order for seventy-two hours to
allow the social welfare department time to decide whether to file a
petition. If the state did not file, then the child would be returned
97
to her mother.
Maryland addressed the issue of the non-offending parent
through statute rather than constitutional interpretation. In In re
Russell G., the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the
Maryland
Child-In-Need-of-Assistance
statute
required
adjudication against both parents before a child could be deemed
98
neglected. The court stated that this decision was consistent with
the purposes of the child-in-need-of-assistance statute in that: “A
child who has at least one parent willing and able to provide the
child with proper care and attention should not be taken from both
99
parents and be made a ward of the court.”

92. Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 477–78; see also In re Alfredo S., 568 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (“If the
Department believed the petitioner to be an unfit father, it was obligated to make
a sufficient showing in this proceeding of extraordinary circumstances, or to
commence a neglect proceeding against him.”).
97. In re Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
98. 672 A.2d 109, 114 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
99. Id.
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Although the court did not render its holding as a matter of
constitutional law, it reached the constitutionally correct result.
While this was the right result as a matter of law, the holding
nonetheless presented practical problems for family court judges.
In some cases, the non-offending parent did not have legal custody
of the child because the offending parent received custody in a
prior divorce proceeding. Literal application of the law would
leave family court judges compelled to return a child to an abusive
parent because the non-offending parent, while fit, would not have
100
legal custody.
In response to this problem, the Maryland legislature devised
a unique solution. It revised its child-in-need-of-assistance statute
to allow a modification of custody upon a finding that the
allegations in the petition are true. Specifically, Maryland Code
section 3-819(e) states:
If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one
parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is
able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that
the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing
101
the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.

The finding that the allegations are sustained against one parent is
102
a jurisdictional precondition to the modification of custody. The
Maryland approach has the advantage of simultaneously protecting
the child from the offending parent, protecting the rights of the fit
parent, and preserving the family, all of which are consistent with
the goals of family laws throughout the country. While Maryland
approached this as a statutory issue in Sophie S., the unfitness
finding is constitutionally required before a court has jurisdiction to
103
deprive a parent of custody.
Pennsylvania addressed the practical need to transfer custody
from the abusive, unfit, parent to the fit parent through case law
104
rather than legislative action. In In re Jeffrey S., the father faced
105
The mother and father of the
an accusation of sexual abuse.
106
The mother
children were married at the time of the abuse.

100. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)
(paraphrasing counsel for Department of Social Services recitation of history of
Maryland Code section 3-819(e)).
101. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e) (2007).
102. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d at 1133.
103. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972).
104. 628 A.2d 439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
105. Id. at 440.
106. Id.
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found out about the abuse, informed the authorities, and petitioned
under state law to have the father removed from the home.107
Subsequently, the mother requested that the father be
permitted to return to the home, and made arrangements for her
108
The state filed a
children to stay with the grandmother.
dependency petition, heard in court on the same day the father
109
The
entered a guilty plea to some of the criminal allegations.
trial court sustained a finding of dependency based on the theory
that the mother had minimized the abuse and wavered in her
110
111
support of her husband. The court of appeals reversed. Noting
that the purpose of child dependency proceedings is to preserve
families, the court stated that a child cannot be adjudged
dependent “where an innocent, caring, and loving parent is ready,
willing, and able to provide the child with proper parental care and
112
control.”
The Jeffrey S. court rightly concluded that the existence of a fit
parent negated the right of the state to insert itself into the family.
Because the parents were married, however, the opinion did not
address the impact of a prior custody order on the court’s ability to
protect the child from an offending parent. Following this ruling,
Pennsylvania family courts thus faced the same problem Maryland
courts had; when a prior custody order granted custody to the
offending parent, judges were put in the position of returning a
child to an abusive parent, even where the non-custodial parent
was fit.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court solved this problem with its
113
holding in In re M.L., a case involving unfounded allegations of
sexual abuse of a child made by the child’s mother against the
114
The trial court adjudicated the child dependent even
father.
115
though the father was available to care for the child. In reversing,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
When a court adjudges a child dependent, that court then
possesses the authority to place the child in the custody of a
relative or a public or private agency. Where a non-custodial

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 441.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 757 A.2d 849 (Pa. 2000).
114. Id. at 850.
115. Id. Although the trial court adjudicated the child as dependent, it did
award custody to the father. Id.
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parent is available and willing to provide care to the child, such
power in the hands of the court is an unwarranted intrusion into
the family. Only where a child is truly lacking a parent, guardian
or legal custodian who can provide adequate care should we
116
allow our courts to exercise such authority.

To solve the problem of prior civil custody orders, the court stated
that trial courts in dependency cases have the inherent authority to
modify child custody orders, based on the statutory mandate to act
117
in the best interests of the children. This authority exists with or
118
without a dependency finding.
While this approach seems to offer greater flexibility to judges
in changing custody orders in the best interests of the children, it is
constitutionally questionable. Unlike in Maryland, no official
finding of unfitness on the part of either parent is explicitly
119
required before a Pennsylvania court can change custody.
Unfitness is the indispensable constitutional trigger to judicial
120
Despite this constitutional flaw,
intrusion in the family unit.
Pennsylvania’s solution does give it the power needed to protect
both the child and the non-offending parent. The constitutional
concern is easily addressed by requiring a trial court judge to make
a finding that the offending parent is unfit before custody is
modified.
These states provide valuable guidance to Alaska in tackling
the gap in Alaska law regarding the non-offending parent. To fix
this problem, Alaska should adopt the first principle of parental
rights enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v.
121
and duly followed by New York, Maryland and
Illinois,
Pennsylvania through their case law and legislation—a child is not
in need of aid if he has a fit parent available and willing to care for
him. As seen by the examples of these three states, recognition of
this first principle would not put an onerous burden on the state,
122
nor would it endanger the children in the state’s care. It would

116. Id. at 851.
117. Id. at 851 n.3.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 851.
120. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 56, 68–69 (2000).
121. 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972).
122. See also In re Okla. Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d
119, 131 (Okla. 2005) (discussing necessary evidence for adjudication of
deprivation of a child and stating that a child is not deprived “if the other parent
was providing satisfactory care for the child”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
4035(2)(C) (2006) (requiring court to make “a jeopardy determination with
regard to each parent who has been properly served”). Oklahoma and Maine
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mean only that children would return more quickly to their families
and the state would save resources for truly needy children.
C. The Constitutionally Dubious Compromise: States Allowing
Adjudication Based on the Acts of One Parent, but Drawing
the Constitutional Line at Custody
The second general approach among states to non-offending
parents is that adjudication can be based on the acts of one parent,
but states temper that constitutional imposition with a presumptive
right of custody for the non-offending parent with the burden on
123
the state to show unfitness prior to denying custody. However,
even that compromise position is increasingly being challenged as
124
unconstitutional. In those states allowing adjudication based on
the acts of one parent, no cases have directly challenged the
constitutionality of the statutes when one fit parent is present and
able to arrange satisfactory care for his children. On these facts,
125
those statutes would be ripe for a constitutional challenge.
Alaska should not embrace this approach as it is constitutionally
dubious, intellectually incoherent, and does nothing more to
protect children than adhering to the first principles of parental
rights.
California’s scheme is an example of this intellectual
incoherence. California deals with the question of non-offending
parents by permitting the adjudication of a child as dependent
based on the actions of one parent and then presumptively entitling
the non-offending parent to custody at disposition. However, while
the California appellate courts have stated that adjudication can
occur in the absence of a finding of unfitness of both parents, the
question of whether “the non-offending parent can protect the
child from the offending one is relevant to a determination of

save state resources and protect families from unwarranted intrusion through
these legal mechanisms.
123. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.521 (2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2
(2007); In re Austin P., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); B.C. v.
Dep’t of Children and Families, 864 So. 2d 486, 490–91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
In re Stephanie H., 639 N.W.2d 668, 679 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
124. See B.C., 864 So. 2d at 491 (holding that Florida statutory law allows
adjudication based on acts of one parent, but remanding to allow father to make a
record on an as-applied constitutional challenge); see also Sankaran, supra note
69, at 22 (criticizing as unconstitutional Michigan’s holding in In re C.R., 646
N.W.2d 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), which he interprets as allowing adjudication
based on the acts of one parent).
125. See Sankaran, supra note 69, at 24; see also discussion supra Part II.
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whether the petition should be dismissed altogether.”126 In Aaron
S., the California Appellate Court went on to say that it is
“appropriate to sustain a petition on the basis of one parent’s
127
conduct if the other parent will not be able to protect the child.”
This approach to adjudication needlessly muddies the
distinctions between fit and unfit parents. A parent who is
unwilling to protect his child from serious harm is—or should be
deemed—unfit; therefore, the state could file a petition alleging
unfitness and have adjudication against both parents. As it is, the
constitutionally required finding of unfitness is relegated to an
evidentiary matter under California law. The simple act of filing a
petition naming both parents (if known) would avert the
constitutional problems inherent in California’s adjudication
system.
While California’s method of adjudication is constitutionally
suspect, California does protect the rights of a fit parent to the
custody of his or her children at disposition. Once a child is
deemed dependent, a non-offending parent is entitled to file a
128
The parent is
petition requesting custody of the child.
presumptively entitled to custody absent a showing of detriment to
129
the child. In other words, before the court may interfere in the
familial relationship by seeking custody and/or removal of the child
from the home, California requires a showing that the
presumptively non-offending parent is unfit.
The presumptive right of custody for the non-offending parent
is consistent with those states allowing adjudication based on the
130
While the non-offending parent retains
acts of one parent.
custody of the child, adjudication can still take place. In Florida,
for example, a child can be deemed dependent even when a fit

126. In re Aaron S., 228 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
127. Id.
128. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 361.2.
129. In re Austin P., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
130. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 361.2 (applies to a previously non-custodial
parent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-307 (2007) (applies to a previously noncustodial parent). A California court has held that the constitutional rights of an
incarcerated father who could delegate care of his children while incarcerated
prevented the state from usurping custody absent a showing of physical harm to
the child from the father’s planned arrangement. See In re Isayah C., 13 Cal. Rptr.
3d 198, 209–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Likewise, in Nebraska, the courts permit the
adjudication of a child in need of assistance with a non-offending parent present,
but require proof of unfitness before the non-offending parent can be denied
custody. In re Stephanie H., 639 N.W.2d 668, 679–82 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).

02__GREENE.DOC

196

12/17/2007 11:29:36 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[24:173

parent is available to care for him.131 This constitutional imposition
on the fit parent is mitigated by Florida’s mandate requiring “the
court to place a child with a nonoffending parent who desires to
assume custody unless there is a showing that the child would be
endangered by such placement. Further, the best interest standard
132
As in California, the Florida courts require a
does not apply.”
showing that the non-offending parent is unfit before denying
custody.
This right to custody in Florida applies even when the nonoffending parent has not had any prior contact with his child. In In
133
re K.M., the state filed a dependency petition against the mother,
claiming that she could not parent her children due to her
134
The state placed the child
substance abuse and mental illness.
135
At the time, the father’s whereabouts
with maternal relatives.
were unknown and the trial court specifically withheld adjudication
136
as to him. One month later, the father was identified and found
137
to be living in New York. He wrote a letter to the court asserting
his right to raise his child and inquiring as to the steps he needed to
138
take to achieve that goal. The trial court subsequently found him
to be a non-offending parent under Florida law and ordered a
home study to be done in New York pending placement of the
139
Meanwhile, the court ordered telephonic
child with him.
140
visitation for the father.
After numerous delays in the home study process because of
concern over living arrangements of the father’s girlfriend, the trial
court denied the father’s motion for custody of his child and
141
The
granted permanent custody to the maternal grandmother.
trial court also ordered the grandmother to encourage telephonic
visits between the father and child, but did not grant him any

131. B.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 864 So. 2d 486, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that a single parent adjudication is permitted under the
statute, but remanding to permit an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of
the statute).
132. In re K.M., 946 So. 2d 1214, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.521(3)(b) (2007).
133. 946 So. 2d at 1214.
134. Id. at 1216.
135. Id. at 1217.
136. Id. at 1216–17.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1217.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1217–18.
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visitation rights.142 The father appealed, arguing that Florida law
required custody with the non-offending parent unless “such
placement would endanger the safety, well-being, or physical,
143
mental, or emotional health” of his child.
The court of appeals agreed, noting that the father has a
fundamental liberty interest in the care of his children and that the
trial court should have considered only whether placement with the
144
Since the trial
non-offending parent would endanger the child.
court had not made that finding, and the New York home study
came back without significant concerns, the Florida appellate court
remanded the case to the trial court for proper review under the
145
The fact that, according to the opinion, the father had
statute.
not seen his child prior to state involvement, and may have seen his
child only once in the year of litigation, was not considered by the
146
court. Because the father was fit, he had the paramount right to
raise his child, notwithstanding his lack of contact with the child
147
prior to state interference.
Though the Florida court opinion did not explain why the best
interest standard did not apply when considering custody for a nonoffending parent, the reason is constitutionally obvious. As stated
in Troxel v. Granville, “there is a presumption that fit parents act in
148
the best interests of their children.” Consequently, so long as a
parent is fit under Florida law “there will normally be no reason for
the State to inject itself further into the private realm of the
149
family . . . .” Thus, even though the father of K.M. had not seen
his child, he was considered fit; the court therefore had no reason
to keep custody from him.
Although these states offer some protection to the nonoffending parent by drawing the constitutional line at the custody
determination, the practice is still unconstitutional. Without the

142. Id. at 1218.
143. Id. at 1219 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.521(3)(b) (2007) (“If there is a
parent with whom the child was not residing at the time the events or conditions
arose that brought the child within the jurisdiction of the court who desires to
assume custody of the child, the court shall place the child with that parent upon
completion of a home study, unless the court finds that such placement would
endanger the safety, well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the
child.”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1219–20.
146. See id. at 1216–17 n.3.
147. The court’s opinion does not disclose the child’s age.
148. 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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initial unfitness pronouncement at adjudication, these states lack
the constitutionally required compelling interest to make a custody
150
In this situation, the nondetermination in the first instance.
offending parent’s fundamental right to non-interference in the
parent-child relationship was unjustifiably impaired.
Alaska
should not adopt this standard when addressing the rights of nonoffending parents.
D. The Unconstitutional Solution: No Protection at all for the Fit
Parent
Among states that have addressed the issue, Ohio stands alone
in granting no protection to the fit parent. In a decision that can
only be described as a national anomaly, the Ohio Supreme Court
held, in a 4-3 decision, that a fit parent has no superior right to the
151
care and custody of his child as against the state. In In re C.R.,
the Ohio Supreme Court held: “[W]hen a juvenile court
adjudicates a child to be abused, neglected, or dependent, it has no
duty to make a separate finding at the dispositional hearing that a
noncustodial parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody to
152
a nonparent.”
In this case, the legal issue raised on appeal was the trial
court’s grant of custody to a non-parent at disposition, even though
153
a fit parent was present and wanted to care for his child. In states
like Florida, California and Nebraska, where the state claims the
power to adjudicate even when a fit parent is present, the father
would have the presumptive right of custody at the disposition
154
However, with this decision
hearing absent proof he was unfit.
Ohio has gone further than any other state as the result of the
court’s failure to draw a constitutional line for state intrusion on
the parents’ rights.
As pointed out in the dissent, the majority opinion in C.R.
does not address the father’s fundamental rights; the entire
majority opinion is in fact devoid of any mention of his
155
Given
constitutional right to the care and custody of his child.
the weight of this fundamental right, the majority’s opinion that an
unfitness finding is not required before an award of custody to a
non-parent is startling because it ignores direct United States

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
843 N.E.2d 1188 (Ohio 2006).
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1190.
See supra Part IV.C.
In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at 1193 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court authority to the contrary.156 No other state has
gone as far as Ohio in explicitly denying fit parents custody of their
children. When clarifying its law on non-offending parents, Alaska
should not join Ohio in abrogating the constitutional rights of the
parents.
V. SO WHAT ABOUT OUR ALASKA
CRAB FISHERMAN: HOW TO PROTECT THE CHILD AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PARENTS
So what would our crab fisherman do with all of this
information? As noted in Part II, our crab fisherman has a number
of rights that can be enforced by the court while simultaneously
protecting his children from the negligent mother. As a first
principle, he has the constitutional right to the care and custody of
157
However, even
his children, unless Alaska shows that he is unfit.
with this fundamental right, under current Alaska law he is caught
in the legal equivalent of a tangled fishing net.
No Alaska law specifically addresses the rights of fit parents in
these circumstances, and this father’s fundamental right to parent
collides with the state’s interest in ensuring the safety of his
children after they were taken from the custody of an alcoholic,
neglectful mother. Under the current state of legal affairs, he is at
the mercy of the court and OCS; no Alaska rules or statutes guide
either the courts’ or OCS’s consideration of his conduct and rights,
as distinct from his wife’s rights. Nor does any rule spell out the
balance between his rights and the state’s obligations to children.
When our crab fisherman finally arrives at OCS in Anchorage
and demands his children, do his constitutional rights mean OCS
must give him the children upon nothing more than presentment of
identification? No; of course not. The state should have an
opportunity to check to make sure the putative father is who he
says he is, that he is not a registered sex offender, someone with a
history of violence against the children, or otherwise unfit to
parent. This minimal intrusion on his liberty would certainly be
permissible under the balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
158
Eldridge.
The Eldridge test requires a weighing of three factors to
determine the process due to a litigant before the government: (1)
the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of the interest through the procedures used; and (3) the

156. See supra Part II.
157. See supra Part II; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972).
158. See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
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significance of the government’s interest.159 Here, the father’s
private interest in the care and custody of his children is certainly
of the highest order. Yet, balanced against the risks to the children
of an erroneous decision should the father be abusive or a sex
offender, a background check and few days of visitation hardly
seems an intrusion sufficient to trump the state’s compelling
interest in the welfare of children.
This investigation could be, and should be, done relatively
quickly. A model solution would be a court rule in Alaska
following the guidance by the New York Family Court in In re
160
Cheryl K. In that case, the New York Family Court held that the
state had seventy-two hours to file a petition alleging the mother
161
unfit if it did not want to turn the child over to the parent.
Alaska could fashion a rule allowing OCS seventy-two hours to do
a background check on the non-offending parent to see if there are
child protection concerns. While waiting for the background
check, a non-offending parent would have liberal visitation. If no
protection concerns arise during the visitation and background
check, the child would be released into the custody of the parent
and the petition dismissed.
One of the factors to be considered in this investigation is
whether the crab fisherman can make arrangements to protect the
children from the actions of the mother, who had become an
alcoholic while the father was fishing. If he could do so, perhaps by
having extended family assist in the children’s care while he goes
back to crab fishing, there would be no risk to the children. If the
father’s plan consisted of offering the mother a stern scolding but
continuing to leave the children in her care, the state would be free
to amend its petition; it could allege that the father is exposing his
children to a substantial risk of harm by not protecting them from
162
The state would then be within its constitutional
his wife.
authority to pursue adjudication against both parents.
Suppose our crab fisherman is committed to protecting his
children, and asserts that he will leave them in the care of their
grandmother while he is fishing, thus not putting the children at
risk. The state still faces the question of how to assist this father in
protecting the children from the mother, especially if the father
were to institute separation proceedings based on her conduct.
Maryland’s statute provides valuable guidance in this regard.

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
484 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
Id. at 477–78.
See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(6) (2006).
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Alaska could adopt a similar statute permitting an award of
custody upon a finding that the allegations in the petition are
163
true.
Under the Maryland scheme, the trial court could not find that
the crab fisherman’s children were in need of aid because they had
a fit parent, the father, to care for them, and it could award sole
164
custody to him. Proceeding in this way minimally infringes upon
the constitutional rights of the father while protecting the state’s
compelling interest in the welfare of the children. Once the court
issues the custody order, the children would be protected from
unauthorized contact with the mother. By dismissing the case, the
court is not burdened with a continuing and unnecessary child
protection proceeding that takes resources from addressing the
concerns of truly needy children.
Our crab fisherman has some decisions to make regarding his
family. With some changes and clarity to Alaska law and minimal
involvement by social workers, our crab fisherman could make
those decisions and be back at sea earning a wage to support his
165
His
family within days of taking his children into his custody.
children could be safe with their grandmother, the father’s mother,
while he worked. Hopefully, his wife would find her way to a
treatment program, but, since the children are safe, the state would
no longer need to be involved in his family, thereby saving
resources for more difficult cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most child protection cases are more difficult than that of the
crab fisherman, but the same constitutional principles always apply.
For example, one can imagine a soldier being stationed away from
his child and while he is out of the state and unaware the mother of
his child gives the child to OCS with the understanding that he or
she will be adopted. The father has no notice of the plan as the
mother has informed OCS that the father is unknown. The child is
well cared for in the pre-adoptive placement, and the proposed
parents love him. Due to circumstances beyond his control, the

163. Alaska could also adopt Pennsylvania’s approach, holding that judges in
children’s matters have the inherent authority to modify custody orders using the
court’s power to act in the best interests of the children. See In re M.L., 757 A.2d
849, 851 n.3 (Pa. 2000). However, to be constitutional, this would require a
finding that one parent was unfit.
164. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e) (2006).
165. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.065(2) (“It is the policy of the state to
strengthen families and to protect children from child abuse and neglect . . . .”).
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soldier might be gone a year or more before he can get emergency
leave and come home to get his child, place him or her with family,
and rejoin his unit. There are also cases in which the correct father
is not identified for some period of time, and it is only long into the
child protection process that the father comes forward claiming
fitness and a desire to raise his child. In either of these
circumstances, the child would be a virtual stranger to the father
and have already bonded with the foster parents.
Upon these facts, it would be difficult for a judge to award
custody against the state and to the father, but the court must
unless the father is found unfit. The court must return the child,
because it is not the business of the courts to decide that “some
other person might possibly furnish the child a better home or
166
The law presumes the child’s best interests are
better care.”
167
Therefore, if an
served in the care and custody of a fit parent.
investigation into the father yields no child protection concerns,
and the parent is fit, the child belongs with the parent even when,
168
as in the case of the father in In re K.M., the parent is a virtual
stranger to the child.
In these difficult situations, parents, children, social workers,
lawyers, and judges would be well-served by guidance in the form
of rules and statutes designed to protect the rights of fit parents,
while keeping in mind the welfare of the children. Alaska, and
other states that have not already done so, should adopt the
minimally intrusive rules advocated in this Article to provide
clarity and protection to the non-offending parent. By following
this model, families can be reunited sooner and state resources
reserved for those families needing stronger intervention.

166. Hammack v. Wise, 211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (W.Va. 1975) (quoting State Dep’t
of Pub. Assistance v. Pettrey, 92 S.E.2d 917, 921 (W.Va. 1956)).
167. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
168. See 946 So. 2d 1214, 1216 n.3, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

